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The independence of expression
and identity in face-processing:
evidence from neuropsychological
case studies
Sarah Bate* and Rachel Bennetts
Department of Psychology, Faculty of Science and Technology, Bournemouth University, Poole, UK
The processing of facial identity and facial expression have traditionally been seen as
independent—a hypothesis that has largely been informed by a key double dissociation
between neurological patients with a deficit in facial identity recognition but not
facial expression recognition, and those with the reverse pattern of impairment. The
independence hypothesis is also reflected in more recent anatomical models of face-
processing, although these theories permit some interaction between the two processes.
Given that much of the traditional patient-based evidence has been criticized, a review
of more recent case reports that are accompanied by neuroimaging data is timely.
Further, the performance of individuals with developmental face-processing deficits has
recently been considered with regard to the independence debate. This paper reviews
evidence from both acquired and developmental disorders, identifying methodological
and theoretical strengths and caveats in these reports, and highlighting pertinent avenues
for future research.
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Introduction
The human face conveys information regarding a person’s identity (e.g., Schyns and Oliva, 1999;
Gosselin and Schyns, 2001), emotional state (e.g., Ekman and Friesen, 1976; Smith et al., 2005),
gender (e.g., Brown and Perrett, 1993), age (e.g., George and Hole, 1995), and direction of attention
(e.g., Sander et al., 2007). This information is rapidly filtered so complex perceptual categorizations
can be performed (Schyns et al., 2009). Despite decades of research on how we extract various cues
from faces, it is still widely debated whether identity and expression information is processed and
represented within shared or independent systems.
One way to approach this question is to examine the type of basic visual information (e.g., spatial
frequency ranges or spatial location of diagnostic cues) and perceptual processes (e.g., holistic and
featural or analytic processing) that are used to make identity and expression judgments. Studies
examining the effect of spatial frequency (i.e., coarse vs. fine visual information) do not show a strict
dissociation between expression and identity judgments: although certain spatial frequency bands
may bemore conducive to identification or detection of individual emotions (e.g., Costen et al., 1996;
Gao and Maurer, 2011; Kumar and Srinivasan, 2011), or may be used preferentially for different
tasks (e.g., Schyns and Oliva, 1999; Deruelle and Fagot, 2005); both high and low spatial frequency
bands carry sufficient information to convey expression and identity information (e.g., Deruelle and
Fagot, 2005), and biases toward spatial frequency bands are not fixed (Schyns and Oliva, 1999).
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As such, spatial frequency bands cannot be taken to represent
dissociable pathways of visual processing for expression and
identity. However, techniques such as the “Bubbles” task
(Gosselin and Schyns, 2001) indicate that typical perceivers do
focus or rely on subtly different areas of the face when making
expression and identity judgments—for instance, perceivers use a
variety of discrete facial regions for different expression judgments
(e.g., Smith et al., 2005), whereas identity judgments rely on a
more diffuse area of the face, encompassing the eyes, nose, and
mouth (Gosselin and Schyns, 2001; Schyns et al., 2002). Taken
together, these findings are consistent with the idea that facial
identity information is processed in a holistic manner (seeMaurer
et al., 2002; Piepers and Robbins, 2012; for a definition and
discussion of holistic processing), encompassing both individual
facial features and their precise spatial configuration; whereas
expression judgments may rely more on processing of individual
components or conjunctions of components. For example,
research using the composite task has found that, in general,
identity judgments rely quite strongly on the integration of
information from the top and bottom halves of the face (see
Rossion, 2013 for a review). Expression judgments also show this
“composite effect,” suggesting that expressions are also processed
holistically, but some authors have suggested that this process
is independent of or different from the holistic processing that
occurs for identity (Calder et al., 2000;White, 2000). Furthermore,
other studies have suggested that componential or part-based
processing is more efficient, and hence the default route of visual
processing, for expression judgments (Tanaka et al., 2012; see also
Ellison and Massaro, 1997). In sum, then, expression and identity
judgments may rely on subtly different visual cues and processing
styles, with identity judgments making use of more diffuse spatial
areas of the face and a processing style that integrates information
from across these areas, and expression judgments relying on
smaller spatial areas (incorporating one or two facial features)
and a more piecemeal or componential processing style. While
this gives some indication that identity and expression may make
use of similar, or at least overlapping, visual information, it still
leaves open the question of whether individuals access these
visual cues or processing styles separately for different tasks, or
whether they are irrevocably intertwined. As such, this paper
focuses on research into neuropsychological case studies, and the
contribution they can make to this debate.
Current face-processing models support the segregation of
identity and expressionmechanisms. Functionalmodels posit that
identity and expression information is processed independently,
although some interactionmay bemediated by thewider cognitive
system (e.g., Bruce and Young, 1986; see Figure 1). Anatomical
models (e.g., Haxby et al., 2000; Gobbini and Haxby, 2007)
distinguish between static structural properties of the face that
relate to a single person (e.g., the shape and spacing of the
facial features provide information on facial identity: Sergent,
1985), and dynamic variant information that is common to
many individuals (e.g., positions of the muscles that convey
an emotional state). Anatomically distinct brain regions are
believed to analyze this information, with the lateral fusiform
gyrus processing identity and the superior temporal sulcus (STS)
expression (see Figure 2). While the anatomical model predicts
FIGURE 1 | The cognitive model of face-processing proposed by
Bruce and Young (1986).
this split occurs after an early stage of perceptual processing in the
inferior occipital gyrus, other authors suggest this phase involves
higher-level processing of both expression and identity (Calder
and Young, 2005; Palermo et al., 2013). Both accounts are broadly
consistent with the patterns of visual information use outlined
above.
Early evidence supporting the proposed independence
of identity and expression processing (hereon termed “the
independence hypothesis”) came from a double dissociation
between two neurological disorders. One half comes from
individuals with prosopagnosia, who cannot recognize familiar
people yet have preserved processing of facial expression (e.g.,
Tranel et al., 1988). The other half comes from patients who are
impaired at recognizing emotional expressions despite intact
identification abilities (e.g., Young et al., 1993; Hornak et al.,
1996). While the independence hypothesis remains a dominant
aspect of cognitive and anatomical models, much behavioral (e.g.,
Fox and Barton, 2007; Bate et al., 2009a; Campbell and Burke,
2009) and neuroimaging (e.g., Ganel et al., 2005; Fox et al., 2009)
evidence has questioned the degree of separation between the
two processes. Further, Calder and Young (2005) discounted the
traditional patient-based evidence supporting the independence
hypothesis, positing that a single model can achieve independent
coding of identity and expression using the different types of
visual information described above.
Since the publication of Calder and Young’s (2005) review,
new patient reports have overcome the limitations of previous
work. These papers also describe neuroanatomical data that
complement behavioral performance, and some directly assess
the use of perceptual information in expression and identity
processing. Further, several developmental neuropsychological
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FIGURE 2 | An adaptation of the distributed model of face-processing proposed by Haxby et al. (2000).
case studies have addressed the independence hypothesis. This
paper summarizes the patient-based evidence reported since
2005, and presents a timely review of the contribution of
neuropsychological case reports to the independence debate.
Acquired Deficits in Facial Identity
Processing
One half of the neuropsychological double dissociation
traditionally believed to support the independence hypothesis
comes from individuals with prosopagnosia. This condition
typically results from occipitotemporal lesions (Barton, 2008),
and is characterized by a severe impairment in facial identity
recognition. In some cases expression recognition appears
to be preserved (i.e., performance was within the range of
typical age-matched controls; Tranel et al., 1988; McNeil and
Warrington, 1993; Young et al., 1993; Takahashi et al., 1995),
supporting the independence hypothesis. Yet, Calder and
Young (2005) argue that the bulk of this evidence should be
discounted because the prosopagnosia is not visuoperceptual
in origin, instead resulting from prosopamnesia (impaired
recognition of faces encoded after but not before illness
onset; e.g., Tranel et al., 1988), general amnesia, or more
general semantic impairments (e.g., Etcoff, 1984). In fact,
the authors suggested that only two cases truly appeared to
have visuoperceptual deficits (Bruyer et al., 1983; Tranel et al.,
1988), yet both investigations suffered from methodological
or statistical limitations. The authors therefore concluded
that no case of prosopagnosia published prior to their review
provided convincing evidence in support of the independence
hypothesis.
However, since 2005, further instances of prosopagnosia with
preserved expression recognition have been described. Riddoch
et al. (2008) reported patient FB, who had damage to the right
fusiform, right inferior temporal, right middle temporal and
right inferior occipital gyri. FB had severe prosopagnosia yet
scored within the typical range on an expression recognition
test. Yet, the actual processing strategies used by FB were not
assessed, and, in line with previous patient reports (e.g., Adolphs
et al., 2005), the authors suggest that her normal performance on
the expression task may be underpinned by atypical strategies.
As mentioned above, expression processing may rely on both
part-based analytical processing and some degree of holistic
processing. While the possibility was not explicitly tested, the
authors suggest that FB relied on part-based information to a
greater extent than controls in the expression task, and could use
this information to achieve a normal score (see also Baudouin and
Humphreys, 2006).
Fox et al. (2011) used more sensitive measures of identity and
expression perception in four individuals with prosopagnosia,
alongside a fMRI-based functional localizer that identified
preserved and impaired cortical regions. All four patients had
selective difficulties in facial identity recognition, and, consistent
with the anatomical model (Haxby et al., 2000), two had right
inferotemporal lesions and two had damage within the anterior
temporal lobes. Strikingly, the authors also described a fifth
patient with selective damage to the posterior STS (pSTS),
who presented with impaired expression recognition. Notably,
however, these deficits extended to identity recognition when
irrelevant variations in expression needed to be discounted.While
evidence from the four prosopagnosic individuals supports the
independence hypothesis, the latter participant suggests some
overlap in the diagnostic facial information used in the two tasks,
although exactly what diagnostic information (e.g., processing
style; separate visual cues) is currently unclear.
Converging evidence comes from patient HJA, who acquired
damage to the ventral occipital and temporal lobes andwas unable
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to recognize facial identity or static facial expressions at normal
levels (Humphreys et al., 1993), potentially due to abnormal
use of visual information during static expression processing
(Baudouin and Humphreys, 2006). However, HJA performed
significantly better when identifying moving facial expressions
(Humphreys et al., 1993) and when matching moving faces
based on identity (Lander et al., 2004). Although this movement
advantage did not extend to overt identification or face learning,
HJA’s use of movement cues in both identity and expression
decisions suggests that (a) the neural mechanisms subserving
facial movement processing—most likely the pSTS (Pitcher et al.,
2011, 2014; Schultz et al., 2013)—can facilitate both processes,
and (b) these neural mechanisms can be dissociated from
those involved in static face-processing. This latter hypothesis
is encompassed within the anatomical model (see Figure 2),
although the role of the pSTS in identity recognition is less clear.
O’Toole et al. (2002) suggest that the structure may also process
“dynamic facial signatures” (characteristic patterns of motion
that aid identification), although facial movement may also boost
identity recognition by attracting attention and foveal fixation
that guides stimulus-driven selective attention (O’Toole et al.,
2002; Abrams and Christ, 2003). Regardless, this information
may contribute to both expression and identity judgments, yet
a smaller influence on the latter may facilitate identification
only under limited circumstances (e.g., when the individual has
trouble processing static facial cues; see O’Toole et al., 2002, for a
discussion).
While increasing evidence supports independent mechanisms
for dynamic and static facial information, there is less agreement
about the stage at which this split occurs. Haxby et al. (2000)
concur with Bruce and Young (1986) that the bifurcation occurs
at an early stage (i.e., before the formation of view-independent
structural descriptions in the functional model, and before
processing in the lateral fusiform gyrus for identity and the STS
for expression in the anatomical model). However, Palermo et al.
(2011, 2013) posit a higher-order shared stage of processing that
may involve holistic processing. A very recent report supports this
hypothesis. Richoz et al. (2015) investigated the decoding of facial
expression in patient PS, who had major lesions in the left mid-
ventral and the right inferior occipital cortex, and minor lesions
of the left posterior cerebellum and the right middle temporal
gyrus. Previous work by Caldara et al. (2005) indicated that, in a
facial identity task, PS used information in a sub-optimal manner,
focusing on the mouth and external contours and avoiding the
eye region. Yet, Richoz et al. (2015) found that PS used all the
facial features to decode dynamic emotional expressions (with
the exception of fear), and performed within the typical range
when classifying those expressions. Despite this, PS had a general
impairment in categorizing many static facial expressions, which,
in line with the theory of Palermo et al. (2013), the authors
attribute to the right inferior occipital gyrus lesion. They suggest
that the preserved processing of dynamic expressions may occur
via a direct and functionally distinct pathway connecting early
visual cortex to the pSTS. Although this study did not investigate
whether the patient also benefited from dynamic information
in identity judgments, it indicates that the use of both dynamic
and static information should be assessed in expression and
identity tasks. Indeed, dissociable anatomic systems may exist for
dynamic and static information, but there may be some overlap
in the diagnostic information used for expression and identity
judgments in each pathway.
Acquired Deficits in Facial Expression
Recognition
There are fewer reports of acquired deficits in expression
processing and it is not always clear whether facial identity
recognition has been preserved. There is also some variation in
lesion location (which is sometimes under-specified), with early
studies reporting expression recognition difficulties following
diffuse bilateral damage (Kurucz et al., 1980), right (Adolphs
et al., 1996) or left (Young et al., 1993) hemisphere lesions, or
selective amygdala damage (Adolphs et al., 1994; Brierley et al.,
2004). These reportsmay be reconciled by findings that perceptual
and recognition processes may be independently affected, and
this may be related to lesion location. Studies have demonstrated
deficits in expression matching but not naming following right
hemisphere damage (Young et al., 1993), particularly to the right
pSTS (Fox et al., 2011, patient R-ST1). Conversely, deficits in
expression naming and emotional memory have been reported
following unilateral (Adolphs et al., 1999; Brierley et al., 2004;
Fox et al., 2011, patient R-AT1) or bilateral (Brierley et al., 2004)
amygdala damage, respectively. Patient R-AT1 in Fox et al.’s (2011)
report showed no pSTS damage and no difficulty performing
expression matching tasks, suggesting dissociable roles for the
pSTS and amygdala in expression processing. These findings
converge neatly with the anatomical model.
The studies reviewed above mostly relied on categorization
performance rather than examination of processing strategy.
One exception is Adolphs et al.’s (1994) report of patient SM,
who presented with amygdala damage and a selective deficit in
fear recognition. In a later report, the authors found that she
was unable to use diagnostic information from the eye region,
irrespective of emotional expression (Adolphs et al., 2005). This
had presented as a selective impairment in fear recognition
because the eyes are themost important feature for identifying this
emotion. As noted above for investigations examining individuals
with prosopagnosia, categorization performance alone may
obscure atypical use of visual information, influencing the
theoretical conclusions that can be gleaned from patient reports.
Other criticisms suggest this half of the double dissociation has
been over-simplified (Calder and Young, 2005). Evidence suggests
that a single processing stream cannot process all expressions,
as dissociable neural systems have been identified for particular
emotions (e.g., Krolak-Salmon et al., 2003; although it is not clear
if these dissociations are based on the emotion itself or simply
perceptual features that are embedded within that expression, see
Whalen et al., 2004). Instead, selective disruption of expression
recognitionmay reflect damage to amore general emotion system
(Calder and Young, 2005). Indeed, facial expression impairments
are often associated with deficits in decoding vocal expression for
specific emotions (Sprengelmeyer et al., 1999; Calder et al., 2000,
2001) and at a more general level (Adolphs et al., 2002).
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Developmental Cases
Calder and Young (2005) rejected some patient-based evidence
supporting the independence hypothesis on the grounds that it
was developmental in origin. In line with other authors (e.g.,
Bishop, 1997; Karmiloff-Smith et al., 2003), they argue that
individuals with developmental disorders may have had some
form of atypical brain organization from birth. Thus, it is difficult
to interpret developmental cases within cognitive models of the
face-processing system, given that (a) the basic architecture of this
system might not have developed, and (b) it is unknown if the
system can be selectively disrupted in the same manner inferred
for patients with acquired deficits. One could therefore argue
that developmental rather than representational abnormalities
provide a convincing explanation of the basis of face-processing
impairments in these cases.
Despite these issues, several studies have investigated the
independence hypothesis in developmental prosopagnosia.
This disorder is typically viewed as a parallel condition to
acquired prosopagnosia, and is similarly characterized by a
severe and relatively selective deficit in facial identity recognition
(e.g., Duchaine et al., 2007; Bate et al., 2009b; Garrido et al.,
2009; Bate and Cook, 2012). However, these individuals have
never experienced a brain injury, and do not have concurrent
socio-emotional, intellectual or low-level perceptual difficulties.
While some individuals with developmental prosopagnosia have
deficits in facial expression recognition (Duchaine et al., 2006;
Minnebusch et al., 2007), others appear to have a selective
deficit only affecting the recognition of facial identity (Duchaine
et al., 2003; Humphreys et al., 2007). Notably, however, Palermo
et al. (2011) reported 12 developmental prosopagnosics who
displayed normal levels of accuracy on a series of facial expression
recognition tests, yet presented with impaired holistic coding of
both facial expression and facial identity. The authors interpreted
this finding as evidence that the prosopagnosics were relying
on atypical strategies to achieve normal performance on the
expression tasks. Thus, further work that examines actual
processing strategy rather than accuracy and response times
alone is required to clarify whether facial expression recognition
is truly unaffected in some individuals with developmental
prosopagnosia.
Evidence of selectively impaired expression recognition has
been reported in socio-developmental disorders (SDDs), but
findings are mixed. Many studies fail to find group-level deficits,
with individuals falling into both typical and atypical ranges (for
reviews, see Harms et al., 2010; Uljarevic and Hamilton, 2012).
There is nevertheless some evidence that expression and identity
processing can be dissociated (e.g., Hefter et al., 2005), although
particular emotions (e.g., fear and surprise: Ashwin et al., 2007;
Humphreys et al., 2007) appear to be disproportionately affected.
As noted for brain-damaged patients, this evidence again suggests
that deficits in expression recognitionmay be related to emotional
processing more than face-processing. For instance, recent work
suggests that facial (Cook et al., 2013) and vocal (Heaton et al.,
2012) affect recognition deficits in autism may be attributed
to co-occurring alexithymia rather than autism itself. Case
reports of individuals with developmental visuoperceptual deficits
in expression recognition without a concurrent SDD would
provide more convincing evidence to support the independence
hypothesis, yet no known case has been reported to date. This
is unsurprising given that several authors suggest that facial
expression recognition impairments inevitably lead to deficits
in socio-emotional functioning, which may in turn lead to
impairments in facial identity recognition (e.g., Schultz, 2005).
More consistent findings suggesting atypical processing of
facial expression have been observed in studies that examine the
use of diagnostic facial information in SDDs. Several reports
suggest that, during expression recognition, high-functioning
individuals with autism look less at the eye region (e.g., Pelphrey
et al., 2002; Corden et al., 2008) or the inner facial features (eyes,
nose, and mouth; Hernandez et al., 2009; Bal et al., 2010) than
controls, or do not effectively use information from the upper-face
when decoding expressions (Spezio et al., 2007; Gross, 2008).
Conclusion
While patient-based evidence supporting the independence
of facial identity and expression processing was almost
entirely discounted by Calder and Young (2005), more recent
neuropsychological case studies have provided more convincing
evidence supporting the independence hypothesis, particularly
when accompanied by neuroanatomical data. Yet, reliance on
recognition performance alone can clearly obscure atypicalities
in the use of diagnostic visual information in both identity
and expression recognition; and the use of dynamic and static
information should be assessed in both processes, at both
perceptual and mnemonic levels. When tested appropriately,
neurological patients can provide invaluable contributions
to theoretical debates such as the independence hypothesis.
Although suitable patients are rare, supporting evidence may
also be gleaned from more readily available developmental cases.
While some authors have discounted the contribution of these
individuals on theoretical grounds, observation of similar patterns
of performance across acquired and developmental disorders
would ultimately provide more convincing insights into the
independence debate.
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